#Truecrypt 7.2 review generator
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Of course, it might simply be the Ukrainian equivalent of April fools' day or something. Hence the panic-stricken last minute attack. So that'll be a fear/uncertainty/doubt that's about to be thoroughly lain to rest.

#Truecrypt 7.2 review code

Of course code to achieve such mischief would be well outside Truecrypt's advertised functioning and therefore correspondingly conspicuous if any kind of code audit was to be performed. Stashing keys in some obscure PCI EEPROM or secretly signaling them out via the network or somesuch. but that still leaves the possibility of covert-channel 'backdoors' in the application. So we already ***KNOW*** the Truecrypt format is pukka. The project's author has even been kind enough to thoroughly document all the descrepencies he discovered between Truecrypt's documented functioning and its actual functioning. A notable example of such projects which immediately springs to mind is, of course, TC-Play which uses Linux's internal DMCrypt code to deliver a compatible reimplementation. Several such projects have successfully used independent code to recreate Truecrypt's cryptographic functions and their success has already proven that TC does what it says on the tin.

The Truecrypt implementation has already been subjected to what's about as perfect scrutiny as you could hope for: Multiple, independent, concurrent reimplementations. *Yes, we do KNOW that the FUD is just FUD. So YES, it would appear that 'the code-quality inspection force something unseen out of the woodwork' as you put it. an to that end the supposed endorsement of, of all things, Bitlocker! How could you possibly better discredit a security team than have them appear to recommend NSA™ Windows® as a security suite? Awesome stuff boys! What can a cryptography suppressing/subverting government agency do now? Skulk back into the shadows and observe a surge in ciphertext which they cannot break? Hell no! Turn the FUD up to eleven!!!!!!one! Hack the website! Discredit the project NOW! Emergency! Emergency!. Poof go the last vestiges of that FUD campaign.Īll this must raise a rather pressing problem.

#Truecrypt 7.2 review free

Then, as if all that wasn't enough, right in the midst of all this free advertising, a publicly sponsored code audit is due to publish its findings that TC is sound as a pound*. Renowned and respected experts like BS have publicly endorsed it, implosions within their own house have made it BLINDINGLY OBVIOUS to Joe Public that he needs to at least think about it, and to cap it all the source of those 'revelations' has recommended it! Talk about great publicity. Then lately that's all gone horribly wrong for them. Pretending it's over-complicated and botched, a toy mistrusted by real cryptographers, etc. For YEARS said TLAs have been waging an open war of FUD against Truecrypt. It's ***SO*** obviously CIA/NSA wot done it it's not even funny. 'though not in the manner you're attempting to imply. > You'd have to wonder if the code-quality inspection didn't force something unseen out of the woodwork.

#Truecrypt 7.2 review software

And that needs to be creative due to a), which would preclude standard revenue stream from software licensing.Īnd even then, you still need to trust these guys and those crypto experts as well as compilers that were used to build the damn thing. The problem is: b and c cost money, so there needs to be a workable business model. What we need is a truly open-source disk encryption tool which is:Ī) Not based in the USA, so that it cannot be subverted by 'Patriot' actī) Which undergoes regular peer-reviews by multiple crypto expertsĬ) With strictly controlled development policies requiring oversight and expert approval of commits At the end of the day, unless one writes OS and compilers and 'bootstrap' them from its own assembler, it is always involving some degree of implicit trust of 3rd parties.

#Truecrypt 7.2 review generator

There are ways to insert vulnerabilities that would look like ordinary bugs and be very hard to catch even when somebody is really looking in the source code (see how long it took people to figure out that Debian pseudorandom number generator was defunct).

The problem of trust is there for both TrueCrypt and its closed-source alternatives such as BitLocker. If this is configured, then it is done so by a corporate group policy, but it is not ON by default.īitLocker does not allow plausible deniability on the other hand, and there people will need to find some other option now that TrueCrypt development seems to be ending. I use it, since TrueCrypt does not (and, probably, never will after the announcement) support UEFI partitions.Īlso, BitLocker does not, by default, leave a 'backdoor' for domain admins.

#Truecrypt 7.2 review windows 7

Since Windows 7 it allows a passphrase in pretty much the same way as TrueCrypt. Actually, BitLocker does >not< require TPM since Windows 7.